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Don't Shoot the Speaker: Why
Forfeiture Liability for Indecency
Violations over Broadcast Media
Cannot be Expanded to Cover the
Speaker
Kevin Bennardo*
The specter of censorship is once again taking form in
Congress, but this time is set to materialize in a unique and
unprecedented way. Congress is seriously considering new legislation
that would allow the Federal Communications Commission ("FCC") to
levy fines for indecent broadcasts not only against the broadcasters,
but also against the speakers themselves. Such action would not only
be unprecedented, 1 but unconstitutional as well.
Currently, Section 503(b)(5) of the Communications Act of 1934
restricts forfeiture liability to broadcast licensees, except for a few
specified circumstances. 2 Therefore, to be subject to a fine for an
indecency violation, one must generally be the licensee of a broadcast
station. A nonlicensee may be subject to forfeiture liability if the FCC
sends him a citation, gives him reasonable time for an interview with
an FCC official, and the nonlicensee subsequently makes the same
3
sort of violation again.
Currently, the only exceptions to this notice and subsequent
breach requirement for forfeiture liability under indecency violations
are (1) if the nonlicensee is improperly engaging in a broadcast for
which a license is required; or (2) if the nonlicensee is transmitting on
a radio station authorized by the FCC for transmission without a

*
JD Candidate, Ohio State Moritz College of Law. Runner-up in The GRAMMY
Foundation® Entertainment Law Initiative 2006 Writing Competition.
1.
Edward Epstein, Panel OKs Fines on Performers for Indecency, S.F. CHRON.,
Mar. 4, 2004, at A3.
2.
47 U.S.C. § 503(b)(5) (2000).
3.
Id. § 503(b)(5)(A)-(C).
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license 4 (which includes the citizens' band radio service, the radio
control service, and radio service on domestic aircraft and ships5 ). The
reasoning behind these two exceptions is easily grasped. The first
exists because a nonlicensee is improperly broadcasting without a
license, and therefore should be held to the same standards as if he
had obtained a license. The second exists because the nonlicensee is
authorized to broadcast, even though he does not need to seek
individual licenses for the sake of convenience, on the condition that
he still accepts the obligation of abiding by all the same regulations as
6
licensees.
The Broadcast Decency Enforcement Act of 2005 passed
through the House of Representatives by a margin of 389-38 on
February 16, 2005 and was placed on the Senate calendar two days
later. 7 This bill amended Section 503(b)(5) of the Communications Act
of 1934 to include another exception to the notice requirement:
[I]n the case of a determination that a person uttered obscene, indecent, or profane
material that was broadcast by a broadcast station licensee or permittee, if the
person is determined to have willfully and intentionally made the utterance,
8
knowing or having reason to know that the utterance would be broadcast.

In conjunction with this new exception, the Broadcast Decency
Enforcement Act of 2005 also amended Section 503(b)(2) of the
Communications Act of 19349 to raise the maximum forfeiture liability
for entities that are neither a broadcast licensee nor a common carrier
from $10,000 per violation to $500,000.10
In short, under the
Broadcast Decency Enforcement Act of 2005, the newly established
liability for performers or individuals who intentionally utter indecent
remarks over the airwaves can be as high as $500,000 for a single
violation.
Congress undoubtedly has more constitutional leeway to
regulate speech that is broadcast than that which is not. However, a
survey of the reasons that the First Amendment bends (but does not
break) when it comes to broadcasters illustrates why Congress's
ability to punish the broadcaster should not extend to a power to
punish the speaker (whose words are broadcast).
In Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. Federal Communications
Commission, the United States Supreme Court upheld the so-called
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.

Id. § 503(b)(5).
Id. § 307(e)(1).
Id. § 307(e)(2).
H.R. 310, 109th Cong. (2005). The Senate has taken no action on the bill.
H.R. 310 § 4.
Id. § 503(b)(2).
H.R. 310 § 2.
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FCC "Fairness Doctrine."'1 The Fairness Doctrine "imposed on radio
and television broadcasters the requirement that discussion of public
issues be presented on broadcast stations, and that each side of those
issues must be given fair coverage."' 12
This doctrine required
broadcasters that endorsed a political candidate to notify that
candidate's opponent and provide a reasonable opportunity for her to
respond over that broadcaster's airwaves; 3 and also to provide such
an opportunity to respond to any person or group which was
personally attacked "during the presentation of views on a
14
controversial issue of public importance."'
However, five years later the Supreme Court found a similar
compelled "right of reply" Florida statute to be unconstitutional when
applied to newspapers in Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo.'5
The Court stated that the statute, which was first enacted in 1913,
long before the FCC or the Fairness Doctrine even existed, violated
the First Amendment by compelling the newspapers "to publish that
which 'reason' tells them should not be published" and exacting "a
6
penalty on the basis of the content of a newspaper."'
The disparity between these two cases clearly illustrates that
the First Amendment affords less protection to broadcasters than to
other media. The Court on several occasions has endeavored to
explain the basis for these differences.
In Red Lion, the Court found that since licensees were given
the privilege to broadcast over the "scarce" spectrum frequencies, that
privilege could also be subject to conditions.' 7 One such permissible
condition is to force broadcasters to allot a "right of reply" in certain
circumstances, to prevent a few licensees from holding monopoly
control over the content of messages sent out over the airwaves. 18 So
the Court's first early reason for granting less First Amendment
protection to broadcasters was scarcity of the spectrum, a condition
not present in other media like newspapers (although it could be
argued that other scarcity, most notably economic scarcity, similarly
limits that medium).
11.
395 U.S. 367 (1969). Since it was found no longer to serve the public interest,
the FCC has since repealed the Fairness Doctrine. In the Matter of Inquiry into Section
73.1910 of the Commission's Rules and Regulations Concerning the General Fairness

Doctrine Obligations of Broadcast Licensees, 102 F.C.C.2d 145 (1985).
12.
Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 369.
13.

Id. at 374-75.

14.
15.
16.
17.
18.

Id. at 373-74.
418 U.S. 241, 258 (1974).
Id. at 256.
Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 394.
Id. at 391-92.
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The Court took another look at content regulation of broadcast
media in Federal Communications Commission v. Pacifica
Foundation.19 In Pacifica, the Court held that the FCC could punish
licensees for broadcasting speech that was not obscene, but was
merely "profane" or "indecent" (which was prohibited by 18 U.S.C. §
1464),2 0 noting that "of all forms of communication, it is broadcasting
that has received the most limited First Amendment protection." 21 In
other media, such as print, the government cannot regulate or censor
merely indecent or profane material, but only that which is obscene
22
under the Miller standard.
The Court points to two distinct reasons for broadcasters' more
limited First Amendment protection in Pacifica. The Court's first
reason is that "the broadcast media have established a uniquely
pervasive presence in the lives of all Americans." 23 The Court goes on
to note that broadcast media "confront" people in the privacy of their
homes, and the nature of the media makes prior warnings ineffective
24
because people just tuning in may have missed such warnings.
The second major reason for the disparate treatment of
broadcasters from other media is that "broadcasting is uniquely
accessible to children, even those too young to read."25 The Court
found that since broadcast media cannot be regulated as effectively as
other media, such as movie theaters (which can deny minors entrance
to films with indecent content), the potential negative impact of
children receiving indecent broadcasts justified greater regulation of
broadcast content. 26 The Court therefore upheld the FCC's restriction
of broadcasts of indecent material to "times of the day when there is a
27
reasonable risk that children may be in the audience."
In Pacifica the Court did not recognize spectrum scarcity, the
reasoning of Red Lion, as a basis for greater regulation of broadcast
media, even though the FCC explicitly raised the scarcity justification
in its brief.28
Justice Brennan, in dissent, noted the majority's
omission of the spectrum scarcity rationale. 29 He stated that scarcity

19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.

Fed. Commc'n Comm'n v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
Id. at 738.
Id. at 748.
Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 23-24 (1973).
Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 748.
Id. at 748-49.
Id. at 749.
Id. at 749-50.
Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 732.
Id. at 731 n.2.
Id. at 770 n.4 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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was an applicable justification where, as in Red Lion, the FCC was
attempting to increase the diversity of speakers, but not in Pacifica,
where the FCC was censoring speech, and thus decreasing the
30
marketplace of ideas.
Red Lion's spectrum scarcity rationale should, however, apply
regardless of whether the regulation is increasing the diversity of
speakers or decreasing the amount of content in the marketplace of
ideas through censorship. The essence of the spectrum scarcity
rationale is that the "people as a whole retain their interest in free
speech by radio and their collective right to have the medium function
consistently with the ends and purposes of the First Amendment. It is
the right of the viewers and listeners, not the right of the
broadcasters, which is paramount." 31 Since broadcasters hold the
valuable airwaves in trust for the public at large, the same scarcity
rationale that applied in Red Lion should also give the government
the power to punish licensees from using those valuable airwaves for
the broadcast of indecency.
Regardless of whether the spectrum scarcity rationale applies
to content restrictions (or at all anymore), neither it, nor the other two
rationales (pervasiveness and accessibility to children) offered by the
Court for lesser First Amendment protection of broadcast media
explain how that lesser First Amendment protection can be extended
to the individual speakers or performers whose words and actions are
broadcast. The reasons listed above may justify fining broadcast
licensees for broadcasting indecent or profane (but non-obscene)
speech, but those reasons do not justify the same fines to be levied
against the individual speakers and performers themselves, as is
proposed by H.R. 310.
First, spectrum scarcity, as noted above, places a greater
responsibility on broadcasters than on speakers in other media
because not everyone who wants a voice can have one over the
broadcast media. Only so many broadcast television and radio
stations can be licensed without interference among each other, so
those individuals and entities that do secure a license owe a public
debt to use their allotted spectrum for the public good.
The same rationale does not apply to individual speakers who
know that their message will be carried on broadcast stations. A
speaker who willfully makes indecent (but non-obscene) utterances,
knowing those utterances will be broadcast, has not been conferred
the same benefit that a broadcast licensee has been, and therefore
30.
31.

Id.
Red Lion Broad. Co. v. Fed. Commc'n Comm'n, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969).
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does not owe the same public debt. The speaker has been given no
special public trust at the expense of other speakers. It is the licensee
that chose to send this speaker's message out over the airwaves at the
exclusion of other speakers, and therefore it is the licensee that should
be held accountable if the content of that chosen message is indecent.
The second rationale embraced by the Court is the pervasive
32
presence of the broadcast media in the lives of the American public.
Broadcast media come into people's homes, the most private of places,
and no warnings can effectively shield the audience from unwanted
content.
While individual speakers or performers with indecent
messages may know, and even intend, that their indecent (but nonobscene) message be disseminated directly into the living rooms and
bedrooms of every person in America, those speakers are powerless to
effectuate that plan. It is the broadcasters that do the transmitting,
and determine what is sent out over those airwaves.
The licensee decides which radio personality gets the
microphone and which band's performance is broadcast live. Those
personalities and performers may very well know that they are being
broadcast live and every word and gesture they make will be
transmitted into millions of Americans homes, but it is not their
responsibility to make sure those transmissions meet the decency
standards of the FCC. It is the responsibility of the licensees who
apply for and receive the licenses from the FCC to abide by its rules.
The final rationale, that broadcast media are uniquely
accessible to children, 33 similarly does not hold up when attempting to
justify extending liability to individual speakers and performers. The
individual speaker, sitting in his soundproof booth, is not uniquely
accessible to children; nor is the singer whose indecent performance is
being aired live (proper measures can be taken to ensure that children
are not in the live audience). It is the broadcaster that takes that
message and makes it accessible to children, not the speaker or
performer. As discussed under the pervasiveness rationale, it is the
broadcaster that must control the content of its medium; it is not the
duty of free citizens to censor their own behavior whenever they know
a camera or microphone is being pointed at them.
It is the
broadcaster, not the speaker, that sends the indecent message out to
the public and into their homes. Therefore, it is the broadcaster, not
the speaker, that should be held accountable for the content of the
broadcast.
32.
33.

Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 748.
Id. at 749.
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If H.R. 310 is enacted into law, some broadcasters may be more
willing to put some performers on the air, knowing that the
performers may face penalties personally for indecent speech.
However, it will undeniably lead to self-censorship by individuals and
performers. Such performers will no longer be able to express their
message to the fullest extent of their First Amendment freedoms if
they know that a television camera (or radio microphone) is pointed in
their direction.
H.R. 310, if enacted, or any statute that punishes individual
speakers directly for broadcasters' content, is simply unconstitutional
and will restrain free speech. Considering a recent FCC indecency
action clearly illustrates the unjustness of extending liability beyond
the broadcaster to the speaker as well.
The FCC found the broadcast of Bono's use of the "F-word"
during the live telecast of the 2002 Golden Globe Award ceremonies
violated 18 U.S.C. § 1464. 34 Taking for granted that Bono willfully
and intentionally uttered the offending word (which could never truly
be known-a definite shortcoming of H.R. 310) and the fact that he
knew it was being broadcast, he could be fined up to $500,000 under
H.R. 310. However, such a result would punish Bono, a private
speaker, for merely stating his joy at winning the "Best Song" Golden
Globe in a way that is perfectly legal to those present at the
International Ballroom of the Beverly Hilton. It was NBC and its
affiliates that broadcast that message to millions of homes across the
country. Even though Bono might have known that would be the final
destination of his speech, he was merely speaking to a roomful of
people. It was the broadcasters who took that message where it was
not permitted.
Bono's exclamation was not an isolated incident, as the FCC
noted that he had reportedly used the "F-word" during broadcast of
the 1994 Grammy Awards, and Cher had reportedly used the same
word during the 2002 Billboard Awards broadcast.35 Under statutes
like H.R. 310, performers could arguably be fined if a radio station
chose to play their indecent or profane song unedited and the
performer knew at the time of recording that the song would be
broadcast.

34.
In the Matter of Complaints Against Various Broadcast Licensees Regarding
their Airing of the "Golden Globe Awards" Program, 19 F.C.C.R. 4975, 4982 (2004). The
Commission declined to levy any fines for the violations, finding that the licensees were not
on sufficient notice that their broadcasts constituted a violation, but noted that forfeiture
orders could issue for similar broadcasts in the future. Id. at 4981.
35.
Id. at 4979.
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The majority in Pacifica stated that indecent broadcasts during
times of the day when children were likely to be in the audience was
"like a pig in a parlor instead of the barnyard;" that is, something that
is not inherently bad, but can be bad depending on the context. 36 The
same is true of statements like Bono's, which may be perfectly at home
in the Beverly Hilton, but may not belong in the parlors (or living
rooms) of millions of American homes.
Analogously, the First
Amendment protects the production and possession of obscene films, 37
but not the public circulation of the same films. 38 The same is true of
indecent speech: the producer of the speech (the individual speaker)
should not be punished, even though the mass dissemination of it (by
the broadcast licensee) may be. The speaker merely created the pig,
but it is the broadcaster alone that improperly put it in the parlor.

36.
Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 750.
37.
Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 568 (1969).
38.
See, e.g., Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 18-19 (1973) ("This Court has
recognized that the States have a legitimate interest in prohibiting dissemination or
exhibition of obscene material when the mode of dissemination carries with it a significant
danger of offending the sensibilities of unwilling recipients or of exposure to juveniles.").

